biometric bonanza (16/07/2005)
I missed a trick with my last editorial. Instead of storing that sort of transaction information on your mobile phone, it makes far more sense to store it on an ID card linked to a central database. Silly me. Then any company, financial institution or government department would be able to find out exactly what you've been doing and how trustworthy you are. Perfect.
If you've read my rambling editorials over the years, you'll know that I'm not in favour of anything that curtails civil liberties and the increasingly eroded right to privacy in the UK. Some people are willing to accept a loss of personal freedom in exchange for what they perceive to be greater safety. Others would probably do so in exchange for a can of magic beans, but there's not much I can do about those less gifted individuals. Give them a shiny new mobile phone and they won't even notice their human rights being abused.
The problem with the 'safety' argument is that it is rarely based on fact, and more often based on rants in the press fuelled by politicians eager to keep tabs on the population. Identity cards won't prevent terrorism, or even significantly reduce it. They won't make you any safer. They will curtail your freedom of expression, speech and movement.
Electronic tagging was originally introduced for criminals. Biometric, database-linked ID cards will electronically tag everyone in the UK. Even if you trust this government not to abuse such power, do you trust the next? Or the one after that?
For some rational, well-researched arguments about why the UK's proposed biometric ID cards are a bad idea, read this.
Assuming the whole thing doesn't fall apart before it's even been built (it's a government IT project, and they don't have a strong track record), their introduction will mark a significant loss of freedom to everyone in the UK.
Many other countries have ID cards. None has anything like this.
